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Based on a five-year field study of six new ventures, we investigate whether and how 
organization founders use affective influence, a form of emotion management, with diverse 
stakeholders, namely investors, board members, customers, and employees. We found wide 
differences in founders’ propensity to use affective influence actions and that not all affective 
influence actions were effective in mobilizing resources for the new firm. We identified a 
particular form of beneficial affective influence we call “emotional assuring,” which refers 
to affective influence actions that seek to build three different dimensions of trust in regard to 
the new firm: 1) the firm’s integrity; 2) the founder’s competence as an entrepreneur, and 3) the 
founder’s benevolent character. Although firms that practiced little emotional assuring could 
mobilize adequate resources as well as firms that did so in munificent environments, the latter 
gained an upper hand and were more resilient under tough economic conditions. We also 
identified the moderating conditions and limitations of emotional assuring. 
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EMOTIONAL ASSURING, TRUST BUILDING, AND RESOURCE  





Founders of new organizations need to overcome formidable challenges. First and foremost, 
they need to convince various resource holders, including new employees, customers and 
investors, not to mention “the larger community of decision makers,” that their “new product or 
service is worth the cost of replacing the old” (Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 2001, p. 389). And 
they must do so while operating under conditions of uncertainty and despite being hampered 
by low legitimacy and a lack of a track record. But how do entrepreneurs reassure nervous 
stakeholders that their ventures are worthy of support?  
Recent research on entrepreneurship suggests that founders of new organizations can use 
cognition-based social influence actions such as symbolic management or impression 
management behaviors to legitimize their offerings and acquire resources (e.g., Aldrich and 
Fiol, 1994; Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002; Zott and Huy, 2007). This is consistent with the rational, “cool” evaluation criteria (e.g., 
market size, customer acceptance, key success factors, competitive rivalry, barriers to entry, 
founders’ education, quality of founders’ presentations) that resource holders purportedly 
consider when they evaluate new ventures (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; MacMillan, Zemann, 
and SubbaNarashima, 1987; Shepherd, 1999). After all, investors and senior executives who are 
aware of the business risks of new organizations and who have adequate time to ponder their 
decisions are unlikely to be swayed principally by entrepreneurs’ emotional displays (Chen, 
Yao, and Kotha, 2009). Yet, an intriguing question still remains: are “cool” cognition-based 
arguments and actions alone sufficient to convince early stakeholders to buy in and support 
young organizations? 
Some entrepreneurship scholars like Baron (2007, 2008) have begun to question this and 
theorize that affect
1 could also play an important role in the entrepreneurial process. 
Particularly in unpredictable environments filled with uncertainty (Forgas and George, 2001), 
addressing stakeholders’ affective states could help “tip the balance” in favor of a new 
                                              
1 The OED defines the noun Affect as “emotion or desire as influencing behaviour.” Like the adjective affective (and 
not to be confused with effect), it refers to the experience of feeling or emotion, and is a key part of the process of 
an organism’s interaction with stimuli.  
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organization, prompting these stakeholders to mobilize their resources, i.e., provide cognitive, 
material, or social support for it (Dorado, 2005; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007). This argument 
questions the prevailing view of resource holders as predominantly rational, cognition-based 
decision-makers. However, despite the potential importance of affect in influencing resource 
holders, empirical research has underexplored this form of influence. 
Indeed, very few empirical studies have examined entrepreneurs’ affect-based social influencing 
actions — what we call, in short, “affective influence” — i.e., actions that elicit, maintain or 
modify other people’s affective states (Huy, 2002; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991; Williams, 2007). As 
a result, we do not know whether investors, clients, employees and other stakeholders may be 
more willing to support a new venture on affective grounds, in addition to cognitively 
believing in its promise. We also know little about what kinds of affective influence actions 
founders use in their interactions with various venture stakeholders or even whether and how 
founders use affective influence at all. Finally, we also know little about how this might matter 
for firm-level outcomes, for example, in regard to mobilizing resources to help young 
organizations weather survival challenges. Therefore, we ask the following research questions: 
Do founders of new organizations practice affective influence in order to garner support for 
their ventures and, if so, how do they do this? In what way are such affective influence actions 
consequential for the building of new organizations? Finally, what are the conditions under 
which affective influence is more likely to be effective, and why? 
To address these questions, we have adopted a grounded theory-building research design.  
Relying on the findings of a five-year field study of six nascent firms, we build a theory by 
describing how founders of these firms engaged in varying degrees of affective influence and 
the conditions under which affective influence actions matter to the building of new 
organizations. Our research is thus anchored within a social-functional perspective that holds 
that emotions have important social functions and consequences by which they influence not 
only the behavior of those experiencing the emotions but also the behaviors of others (e.g., 
Hochschild, 1983; Keltner and Haidt, 1999). We identified a subset of affective influence actions 
that seek to build three different dimensions of trust in regard to the new firm: the firm’s 
integrity, the founder’s competence as an entrepreneur, and the founder’s benevolent character. 
These actions constitute what we call “emotional assuring.” Although firms that practiced little 
emotional assuring could mobilize adequate resources as well as firms that did so in munificent 
environments, the latter gained a resource mobilization advantage under tough economic 
conditions. We also identified the moderating conditions of affective influence and its 
limitations.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first empirical study that establishes the variety 
of affective influence actions that founders use, how these actions influence organization-level 
outcomes, and why this might be the case. Our concept of emotional assuring bridges and 
contributes to three distinct organizational literatures — entrepreneurship, emotion in 
organizations, and trust. Our findings show how resource-poor founders can rely on a set of 
affect-based behaviors to “create something from nothing” (Baker and Nelson, 2005) through 
mobilizing new resources from stakeholders.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the literatures that inform 
affective influence and resource mobilization in nascent firms. Then we describe how we 
collected and analyzed our data. Third, we describe our key findings, including the various 
kinds of affective influence actions, those that shape emotional assuring, and their effects on  
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resource mobilization. Fourth, we develop the theoretical mechanisms that underlie emotional 
assuring and resource mobilization. We particularly draw on the trust literature, as our findings 
seem to suggest that trust is an important latent mechanism. We conclude by discussing how 
our study contributes to the literature on organizations, and we suggest important areas for 
future research. 
Theory 
Affective Influence in Young Organizations 
In the emotions literature, affective influence is often referred to as “emotion management,” 
and defined as eliciting, maintaining or modifying other people’s affective states (e.g., Barger 
and Grandey, 2006; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991; Williams, 2007). “Affective state” (or affect in 
short) includes feelings, characterized by their valence (pleasant or unpleasant), their activation 
level (high or low), as well as specific emotions such as fear, anger, or joy that involve distinct 
cognitive appraisals (or interpretations) and action tendencies (see Frijda, 1986; Barrett, 2006; 
Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). 
Although emotion scholars study affective influence mainly at the interpersonal level, in an 
organization founding context affect is likely to be particularly important and relevant at the 
firm level, not just at the interpersonal level. When resource holders consider supporting an 
unproven firm in its founding stages, these potential stakeholders expose themselves to high 
risk (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934), including the prospects that the new and unproven 
business model will fail (Thornhill and Amit, 2003) or there will be anemic growth (Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2006). These business risks, which may be difficult even for experts to evaluate 
accurately, can translate into risks for stakeholders’ own economic, social, and personal 
welfare, and can consequently arouse strong emotions. Since emotions generally arise when 
people appraise matters as personally relevant (Lazarus, 1991), founders and stakeholders of 
young organizations are often personally affected by highly volatile business performance 
(Baron, 2008). The strong emotions they feel can influence their subsequent decisions and 
behavior related to how they support the young organization. As a result, affective influence is 
likely to play an important role in contexts of high uncertainty, such as those that characterize 
newly founded organizations. 
Indeed, research on affect (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Schwarz and 
Clore, 2006) suggests that faced with uncertainty and incomplete objective information, 
potential resource holders, such as the first investors, customers, or employees, might consider 
their affective states when making decisions to support or join the young organization. Schwarz 
and Clore (1988) have argued that when people make evaluative judgment (e.g., about the 
potential success of the young firm), they unconsciously ask themselves “how do I feel about 
(the judgment)?” Moreover, psychological research on affective primacy (Zajonc, 1980) has 
shown that affective reactions can be evoked instantaneously with very little cognitive 
processing (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993). As business competence and efficiency cannot be 
proven in the early days of the young organizations, resource holders might rely more heavily 
than is commonly assumed on affect to decide whether they should support the firm.  
We view affective influence in an organization founding context as distinct from emotion 
management, which has often been depicted as the deliberate regulation of individuals’ own  
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emotional expressions in established organizations in accordance with “feeling rules” or 
“display rules” (e.g., Grandey, 2003; Hochschild, 1979; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991; Van Maanen 
and Kunda, 1989). As a result, emotion management in established organizations is sometimes 
associated with coercive, manipulative, or inauthentic behavior (e.g., displayed emotions that 
are different from felt emotions, such as smiling to increase sales even if one is not truly happy) 
that can be harmful to employees’ personal well-being (e.g., Martin, Knopoff, and Beckman, 
1998). To avoid this negative connotation of emotion management, we have chosen the term 
“affective influence.” Affective influence actions do not have to be connected to mandated 
organizational feeling rules and displays. They also range along a continuum from deliberate to 
spontaneous and do not always have to be linked to specific instrumental goals. An example is 
when a spontaneously enthusiastic founder re-energizes her anxious employees even though 
she did not expressly set out to boost their morale. 
To the best of our knowledge, very little and possibly no empirical research on affective 
influence has focused on its role in resource mobilization for organizational creation. Rather, as 
noted above, scholars have focused on how individuals regulate their own emotional 
expressions and the effect this self-regulation has on psychological well-being (e.g., Hochschild, 
1983; Martin et al., 1998; Grandey, Dickter, and Sin, 2004; Tsai and Huang, 2002). This 
research on “emotional labor” has often focused on the behavior of low-status service 
employees with little discretionary power. It has neglected to look at new stakeholders, such as 
investors or board members; individuals who typically have more workplace discretion than do 
low-level service workers. The emotional labor literature has also focused on emotional displays 
as the main influence mechanism. For example, smiling customer service representatives are 
more likely to elicit higher satisfaction from their customers and thus higher repeat businesses 
and sales revenues (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Grandey, 2003). But that literature has not 
considered the wider variety of affective influence actions that could be enacted by creative 
entrepreneurs.
2  
However, the context of organization creation is very different from that of customer service 
delivery. In contrast to a known service exchange, high uncertainty exists about the kinds of 
benefits the various stakeholders will eventually get out of the new business. In addition, the 
resources that stakeholders provide to the new firm can be consequential. Stakeholders are thus 
likely to be motivated to consider founders’ affective influence actions carefully insofar as these 
actions influenced their critical resource commitment decisions (Van Kleef, Homan, Beersma, 
Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, and Damen, 2009). We have much to learn, therefore, 
about how independent and intrinsically motivated founders of new firms influence their 
stakeholders’ affect, and how and why these actions matter for the building of their new 
organizations. 
The few empirical entrepreneurship studies that have considered affective influence have done 
so mainly as a part of broader research into entrepreneurs’ political and social skills. For 
example, researchers have examined the affect-related constructs of “expressiveness” – the 
ability to express one’s emotions and feelings (Baron and Markman, 2000, 2003; Baron and 
Tang, 2009) – and of “passion” (e.g., Baum, Locke, and Smith, 2001; Baum and Locke, 2004; 
                                              
2 Similarly, work on emotional contagion has not focused on the specific challenges of organization and institution 
creation (involving resource mobilization) but, rather, on the influence that one individual’s emotional expression 
can have on the emotional experience of others (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Sy, Côté, and Saavedra, 2005; van Kleef, De 
Dreu, and Manstead, 2004; Tan, Foo, and Kwek, 2004). This research has often been conducted in established firms 
operating in relatively stable environments.  
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Chen et al., 2009). And these few have not produced consistent results. For example, Baum and 
Locke (2004) established that the founders’ character trait of “passion” positively influences 
their competence and motivation, which in turn positively affects venture performance. In 
contrast, Chen et al. (2009) found that “passion” does not matter for resource acquisition, 
echoing prior conjectures about investors’ preponderance for cognitive evaluation criteria 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; MacMillan et al., 1987; Shepherd, 1999). Other research on 
entrepreneurs’ passion (e.g., Cardon, Wincent, Singh, and Drnovsek, 2009) has explored links 
with founders’ own behaviors rather than those of stakeholders.  
In sum, the potential importance of affective influence in the organization building context and 
the social-interactional nature of such influence have remained insufficiently investigated. 
Although the literature on emotions suggests that affective influence could induce resource 
mobilization, much of the entrepreneurship literature still portrays resource mobilization and 
interactions between founders and stakeholders in that regard as predominantly cognitive. And 
even the emotions literature does not make clear predictions for entrepreneurship settings. For 
example, emotions and their effects can dissipate relatively quickly (Schwarz and Clore, 2006). 
It therefore remains unclear whether short-term affective influence actions can actually 
“induce” (as in lab experiments) vigilant stakeholders, such as savvy investors and experienced 
managers, to provide the kind of long-term support that nascent firms need. To sustain the 
short-term effects of affective influence, stakeholders may need a more enduring mechanism, 
which we posit might be “trust.” Our findings suggest that founders are likely to use affective 
influence successfully, that is, to mobilize resources for their new firms to the extent that their 
actions are associated with building trust. We will further elaborate this insight in the 
discussion section. 
Methods 
We adopted an inductive theory-building research design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 1994) because there are many possible kinds of affective 
influence that entrepreneurs can use, and it is not clear which they actually practice or even if 
they use any at all. Prior research has not established the precise implications of affective 
influence on resource mobilization in the context of new-firm-building. We therefore 
conducted a five-year real-time, longitudinal, and concurrent study of six nascent ventures, all 
of which were based in London, England, where founders reported varying levels of affective 
influence, and we investigated how venture stakeholders responded to such influence actions. 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
To identify entrepreneurs who had recently launched new firms or were in the process of 
creating them, we searched a business school’s database of alumni who had indicated in a 
survey administered during an alumni reunion that they had become involved in 
entrepreneurial ventures after graduation. The resulting list contained 230 names in the United 
Kingdom. We contacted all by e-mail, and explained the purpose of our research. We asked 
them to identify themselves if they 1) had launched a company within the past 18 months or 
were planning to do so in the next six months; if they 2) had their headquarters in the Greater 
London area, and if they 3) were willing to participate in a research project that might involve 
a substantial time commitment. We guaranteed participants complete confidentiality and 
anonymity. We aimed to study entrepreneurs in the early stages of creating their companies for  
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two reasons: First, we wanted to avoid sampling based on outcomes and, second, most 
researchers have ignored these early stages. We focused on a confined geographical area to 
minimize sample variation due to environmental factors (e.g., sociopolitical context, business 
climate, available resources).  
We received 83 replies. After several interactions with these potential firms, we retained an 
initial set of 26 ventures that seemed to suit our criteria: They were based in London, and they 
had materially started up during the period we specified. Initially, we intended to study 
entrepreneurial behavior broadly; our focus on affective influence of stakeholders and its 
importance for resource mobilization emerged only a few years later during our iterative data 
analysis. Most of the ventures in our sample started between 1999 and 2001. When we began 
our research in late 2001, they were at such early stages of development that predictions about 
their eventual success were premature. 
We began by recording entrepreneurial behavior (both in real time and retrospectively) by 
interviewing the founders. Most had graduated from the same top-tier business school, had very 
high GMAT test scores, had several years of professional experience before enrolling in the 
MBA program, and could access the school’s vast and high-powered alumni network. In this 
way, our selection controlled for key aspects of human capital, such as educational background, 
analytical skill, and managerial experience, as well as aspects of social capital — all of which 
are usually considered sources of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ventures. We thus followed 
Gartner’s (1985) suggestion to increase the homogeneity of entrepreneurial sub-groups and look 
for variations within them to develop precise mid-range theories. 
Beginning in February 2002, we conducted face-to-face interviews, mostly at work sites, with 
all entrepreneurs in our sample. We established a personal rapport  with each of them 
individually. Each interview in the first round lasted between one and two hours. The second 
round of interviews took place between October and December 2002, the third in October–
November 2003, the fourth in January–February 2005. For these later rounds, we relied mainly 
on telephone interviews, each of which lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. We interviewed 
stakeholders between November 2005 and July 2006. In all cases, we not only recorded and 
transcribed the interviews but also made extensive handwritten notes. We asked our informants 
to provide us with comprehensive accounts of their activities since the earliest days of their 
ventures. In replying to these questions, our informants often mentioned affective influencing 
actions and emotionally charged situations without any prompting. We also asked open-ended 
questions that triggered concrete examples of affective influence such as the following: Can 
you tell us about some emotionally high and low moments in the last period? How did you deal 
with them? How did you convince potential investors or motivate your employees?  
As our interviews with these 26 founders progressed, we narrowed our focus to six ventures 
that we believed would allow us to explore in depth affective influence and its influence on 
organization-level outcomes. The founders of three of these ventures exhibited noticeably high 
levels of affective influence, and the other three displayed low levels. (We will elaborate on this 
in the findings section.) Focusing on only six cases enabled us to interview a large range of 
venture stakeholders in each, something that would have been difficult with a larger number of 
ventures. Indeed, we expended significant effort to convince the six founders to give us 
unlimited access to their important stakeholders — co-founders, investors, employees, spouses, 
and board members. These sources, as well as our longitudinal research design, enabled us to 
triangulate our findings to build stronger interpretations (Yin, 1994). Some of the questions that 
we asked these stakeholders were: Have you (and/or the founder) experienced any emotionally  
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intense moments with the venture? How did you interact with the entrepreneur or with others 
to deal with these situations? How would you describe the relationships among various people 
in the venture? How would you describe the founder? Interviews with these third parties lasted 
between 15 minutes and two hours.  
We thus followed Eisenhardt’s (1989, 537) recommendation for a theoretical sampling approach 
that involves between four and ten extreme cases in which the phenomenon of interest (here, 
affective influence) is “transparently observable.” Using  a finite number of cases enables 
researchers to find a balance between generating a reasonably textured theory and having to 
cope with large amounts of data (e.g., Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). By focusing on affective 
influence we cannot (nor do we wish to) claim that it is the only means to build support for 
new ventures. Other largely non-affective approaches may also be at work in entrepreneurial 
contexts, such as impression or symbolic management (e.g., Higgins and Gulati, 2003; 
Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). And sometimes such cognition-based approaches can be highly 
effective (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Zott and Huy, 2007). Our primary intention with this paper, 
however, was to examine the outcomes and boundary conditions of affective influence, and not 
to prove or disprove the effectiveness of other forms of social influence.  
Table 1 presents short descriptions of our six cases (the names of the companies and 

















8 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Table 1 
Cases and Interviews Per Case 







BUDGET  Formed in September 2001 to operate high quality limited service hotels. Develops sites for new budget motels in partnership with financiers 
and brand owners. Negotiates license agreement, interprets brand standards, implements these standards, and optimizes required 
resources. Then manages the operations (e.g., recruits and trains staff, performs sales and marketing) of the newly built motels under well-
known brands, such as Holiday Inn, without owning the properties. Opened first hotel in March 2003, and by January 2005 had 17 hotels 







of the board, 
investor) 
15 
CONSULT  Founded in May 2000 by former partners of a well-known large global IT consulting firm. Provides IT-supported consulting services to large 
and mid-sized companies. Specializes in procurement (e.g., outsourcing) solutions, but also offers recruiting services. Over five years, grew 
to over 40 strategy, business process, and IT consultants. Seed-funded by business angels, and founders’ equity contributions (in total 






DRINK  Founded in September 2002 to build a whiskey distillery with a production capacity of 40,000 cases per year. At the same time, produces 
and markets a range of innovative white spirits using only natural ingredients for consumers of alcoholic beverages around the world. 
Funded by a large number of private investors, as well as government subsidies. 
4 7 




INCUBATE  Founded in December 2000. Originally, aimed at helping large companies develop new ventures. Then changed business model to 
acquiring ailing on-line retail businesses (e.g., for pet food, and for gardening products), consolidating these businesses and running them 
on a common IT infrastructure. After consolidation, experienced modest growth rates (e.g., pet food business got to size of 20 employees). 




INVEST  Assembled team in January 1998, and closed first deal in September 1998. Provides financial services and specialist financing for European 
early-stage hi-tech companies, especially in biotech, computing and communications infrastructure. After several years of operations, in 
2002 essentially had to wind down first fund and get restarted as a company by raising a new fund (size: over €100 million) from new 
investors with a new management team after some of the original founders had left. As a result, changed the name of the company. Funded 








TECH  Founded in December 1999 to provide wireless telephony solutions for offices and factories. Develops technology that turns mobile phones 
and headsets into extensions of corporate networks and gives portable data devices and smart phones access to local area networks. Grew 
to more than 40 staff (mostly engineers) within three years of founding. Yet failed to produce a commercially viable product. Backed with 










  24 36  60 
                                              
3 Others include co-founders. Some stakeholders provided more than one interview. Therefore, the interview count in each cell of this column might be greater than the total number of 
stakeholders.   
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The ventures in our sample are active in many industries, including hotel management 
(BUDGET), beverage production (DRINK), consulting services (CONSULT), online retailing 
(INCUBATE), financial services (INVEST), and wireless communications (TECH). Thus our sample 
includes diverse industries. All entrepreneurial teams were first-time founders, apart from the 
founder of DRINK who had limited entrepreneurial experience in a different industry. 
Data Analysis 
We used the case-replication method, in which cases serve as independent experiments that 
either confirm or reject emerging insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). We analyzed our data in three 
broad steps. First, based on our interviews with the initial set of 26 founders, we noticed the 
prevalence of emotional experiences in the context of building new companies. Most 
entrepreneurs who spoke to us reported emotionally intense situations. Many of them referred 
to the process of creating a new business as an “emotional rollercoaster.” We found, however, 
that there were stark differences in the way entrepreneurs described their affective experiences: 
some presented very richly textured accounts of emotional situations and how they dealt with 
them, whereas others presented very terse ones — even when describing situations, such as the 
firing of a partner, that could have been intensely emotional. This first analytical step helped us 
focus our attention on the six cases with noticeably rich or terse accounts of emotions. 
Second, we noted quickly sharp distinctions among founders’ ways of influencing other 
people’s affect. Some founders appeared to attend to them more often and in a wider variety of 
ways than others. From that, we surmised that the affective influence of other stakeholders (and 
not just the regulation of one’s own emotions) was potentially important. 
In our third analytical step, we focused on founders’ affective influence of other stakeholders. 
We analyzed statements made during our interviews and assigned them to various categories of 
affective influence actions that founders might use. To avoid biasing our findings towards 
“successful” affective influence actions, we coded these statements irrespective of any 
associated outcome, and it was only later that we looked for the consequence, if any, of each of 
these actions. Although (as we will show in the findings section below) many affective 
influence actions can be causally linked to organization-level resource mobilization outcomes, 
some cannot. For example, when Catherine (the founder of DRINK) described her approach for 
eliciting interest (an emotional state) from potential organization stakeholders she mentioned 
how she would pay close attention to other people’s needs, specifically, to “what would make 
them tick… what’s going to be the finger on the pulse that’s going to make the other person 
react.” Catherine did not mention, in that case, whether her tactic was successful and how so. 
The two authors, working independently and proceeding on the basis of shared definitions of 
specific emotions, coded founders’ affective influence actions only when these actions were 
clearly associated with affective states in other people, such as joy, fun, interest or fear. We 
then compared our results and discussed disagreements. Then each of the authors independently 
went through the codes again to identify any potential associated outcomes. Again we 
compared our results and discussed disagreements. If we could not reach consensus on either 
affective influence action and/or its link to (or lack of) specific outcomes, we dropped the 
respective code. For example, we discarded the following quote from the CONSULT founder 
because it was not clear whether he had affectively influenced others. When asked how he had 
dealt with the disappointment of having been turned down by a particular investor, the founder 
said: “Well, you talk about it. Shit, you just pull each other up. You know, come on, we’ve got  
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plenty of other investors, it’s no major thing.” We interpreted this account as founder’s 
regulation of his own emotions rather than influencing other stakeholders’ affect.  
We coded and labeled affective influence action categories (and outcomes, if we could discern any) 
very closely to the meaning of the data, which include concrete actions such as displaying passion 
with potential investors or organizing energizing events for employees. As summarized in Table 2 
and discussed in the findings below, we also analyzed emotional events (e.g., firing of the CEO or 
board conflicts) where affective influence actions might have been needed but were not practiced. 
By grouping various actions into increasingly abstract (or higher order) categories, we noted that 
founders’ affective influence actions sought to convey implicitly to stakeholders three distinct 
aspects: 1) the quality of the firm; 2) the quality of the founder as an able entrepreneur, and 3) the 
quality of the founder as a caring person. Subsequent reading of the literature about trust suggests 
that these three aspects can be linked to various characteristics of trustworthiness. They can be 
construed as implicit mechanisms that underlie the link between affective influence and resource 
mobilization (we will elaborate on this in the discussion section below). Using the same analytic 
method, we coded whether affective influence actions can have beneficial, harmful, or neutral 
effects on firm outcomes. We discerned two dimensions of resource mobilization. We also 
triangulated these firms’ outcomes with stakeholders’ accounts. 
Findings 
Before describing the kinds of affective influence actions that helped young organizations “tip 
the balance” in their favor in regard to mobilizing resources, we wish to emphasize that we are 
not advocating the benefits of affective influence unconditionally. First, some affective 
influence actions may not have any discernible effects at the organization level, their effect 
may be contingent on other variables, or they may even lead to undesired outcomes, as we will 
show later in this section. Second, firms that favor a cognitive-rational approach and use few 
affective influencing actions can also mobilize adequate resources. This is particularly true 
when firms operate in predictable, resource-rich environments. Our data support this nuance: 
All six firms in our sample were reasonably successful in their early days, in and around the 
years 2000-2001, which was a time of high environmental munificence (Zott and Amit, 2007). 
They managed to acquire vital resources, such as paying customers (with the exception of 
DRINK and TECH, who focused initially on R&D), highly qualified employees, and sufficient 
external funding, so that they could begin developing products and building operations. But 
then the environment changed drastically to one of low munificence, and all founders had 
greater difficulty in acquiring new resources to ensure firm survival and growth. It was at that 
point that differences in resource mobilization began to be seen, differences that we argue can 
be explained in part by the founders’ differing propensity to make use of affective influence. 
Founders’ Affective Influencing Actions  
Our data suggest three types of affective influence actions that helped mobilize resources for 
the young organization, namely those that sought to influence stakeholders’ perceptions about 
the firm in regard to three categories: 1) the integrity of the new firm; 2) the ability of the 
founder as an entrepreneur, and 3) the quality of the founder as a caring person. We found 
significant differences among founders in regard to how they used these three types of affective 
influence actions, as shown in Table 2. (A fourth category of affective influence actions 
evoking threat was used as well, albeit less frequently. We nonetheless explain it below.) 
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Table 2 
Affective Influence Actions Performed by Founder 
 
  BUDGET DRINK  CONSULT  INCUBATE INVEST  TECH 
Affective Influence Actions Conveying Integrity Of New Firm by… 
…emphasizing venture risks  9•  •  99••      
…displaying inclusive and transparent organizing actions  99••  9••  •    9  9†Oo 
Affective Influence Actions Conveying Ability Of Founder as Entrepreneur by… 
…emphasizing valued entrepreneurial characteristics  •  99••  •      
…displaying certainty-related emotions  ••  99••  9•     9• 
Affective Influence Actions Conveying Benevolence of Founder by… 
…organizing energizing events for venture stakeholders  99•  •  99••  9 †  † 
…paying customized attention to stakeholders’ needs  9••  99••  99•  † † 99†Oo 
Affective Influence Actions Conveying Threat    9  9     9• 
 
Table entries: 
99  At least one self-reported action per founder interview 
9  Less than one self-reported action per interview, but at least one self-reported action in all founder interviews 
O  At least one opposite action taken by founder (e.g., displaying opaque rather than transparent organizing action)   
••  At least 0.5 reported actions per stakeholder interview across all interviews with stakeholders 
•  Less than 0.5 reported actions per stakeholder interview across all interviews with stakeholders, but at least one reported action 
†  Any evidence given by stakeholders that affective influence action was not performed 
o  Any evidence given by stakeholders that founder performed opposite affective influence action (e.g., displayed opaque rather than transparent organizing actions) 
 
The checkmarks and dots are measures on a per interview basis and thus take into account that we conducted varying numbers of stakeholder interviews for the various ventures. They make the 
table entries comparable across cases. The cutoff points were chosen to highlight the variation among the cases.  
 
12 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Table 2 depicts our analysis of founders’ affective influence actions independent of their 
outcomes, i.e., whether these actions had positive, neutral, or negative consequences for the 
young organization. Affective influence actions inferred from founders’ accounts are presented 
as checkmarks (9) in the table. When founder actions were confirmed by stakeholders’ 
interviews, we indicate this using dots (•) in the table. Besides, we also indicate actions that 
were the exact opposite of the respective action category in Table 2. For example, if the action 
category was “Influencing affect by displaying transparent and inclusive organizing actions” 
then an action that influenced stakeholders’ affect but that was neither transparent nor 
inclusive would be entered as “O” if the action was inferred from the founder’s account, or “o” 
if it was inferred from a stakeholder’s account. Finally, situations where a founder could have 
used an affective influence action but clearly did not are reported using a cross (†) in the table. 
These situations were inferred from stakeholders’ interviews. For example, one manager of 
TECH deplored the fact that he had not received “public or private praising” from the founder, 
and we considered this an indication that the founder had failed to take care of that manager’s 
personal needs. 
In the text below we will focus on the presentation of those data that a) helped us build our 
concepts (namely, the various affective influence action categories), and that b) suggest a causal 
link between affective influence and resource mobilization, mainly because this link has not yet 
been shown empirically in the literature and has been under-explored theoretically. (For easier 
interpretation of the quotations displayed below, code indicating affect is in bold-face type, 
and code referring to resource mobilization outcomes of affective influence actions is 
underlined.)  
Affective influence actions conveying integrity of the new firm. Integrity here refers to 
honesty and truthfulness in regard to the motivation for one’s actions. Our data show that 
founders can influence potential stakeholders’ feelings about their firms in ways that suggest 
that the new firm has integrity in several key ways. They can emphasize the risky nature of the 
business, they can promote transparency in their operations, and they can display inclusiveness. 
We were surprised by the finding that founders influenced stakeholders’ affect by emphasizing 
business risks during communications with potential investors and employees. We had thought 
that founders would be more likely to emphasize their ventures’ upsides and tone down 
references to any downsides, both to increase stakeholders’ comfort in the firm and because this 
might be expected from people who are prone to overconfidence (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). 
We had also believed that whenever founders mentioned the downsides of their new businesses, 
they would elicit or reinforce stakeholders’ anxiety, leading them to withdraw support. Our data 
showed the opposite effect. 
The founder of CONSULT, Sam, explained to us how he had emphasized the risks of his venture 
to potential new employees, with the surprising result that this made them ready to join: 
In recruiting…the more you try to push people away, the more they want to get involved. 
Absolutely phenomenal. We tell people what we do and say yes, you know, this is really 
exciting stuff, but let’s tell you about the downsides, and boy, there are some downsides. 
We could really screw up on this, we could really screw up on that… there are real risks 
involved (Founder, CONSULT). 
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Sam furthermore explained to us how he had emphasized the risks of his planned venture to 
private investors – again with quite surprising results: “The more that I said, ‘Oh, but there’s 
risk. Oh it’s a bit dodgy. I don’t want to lead you astray, guys,’ – the more I tried to push them 
off… the more they liked it.” Roman, a private investor, confirmed this approach, as well as its 
effectiveness at mobilizing resources: “We’ve all made investments because we wanted to make 
the investment. We weren’t badgered into making an investment. In fact, we were actively 
encouraged not to invest.” Our data thus suggest that emphasizing venture risks may elicit 
positive emotions in potential stakeholders, who then support the young organization. 
Another way of enhancing stakeholders’ perception of a new firm’s integrity is through 
displaying transparent and inclusive organizing actions. This involves enacting management 
actions (e.g., with respect to sales, operations, personnel, or resource allocation) in ways that 
can be observed and verified by stakeholders (i.e., transparent) and/or that involve the 
stakeholders’ participation (i.e., inclusive). Contrary to conventional wisdom, we found that 
successful founders did not take a centralized, secretive, commanding approach to their 
business, as is often used when firms are in a vulnerable stage (e.g., Huy, 2001). For instance, 
BUDGET, a small firm of about 20 people, became a large company of more than 600 
employees virtually overnight when it acquired a large and established hotel chain. Employees 
(staff and middle managers) of the hotel chain were worried about being managed by such a 
small and unproven company. The BUDGET founder, James, assuaged their concerns by 
involving them in projects that gave them an opportunity to actively shape their future. 
We’ve started to set up project teams to do things. One of the things they’ve said is look, 
we need to think about uniforms. So we said okay, fine, two of you as general managers 
are now responsible for thinking about new uniforms. We’ve put another project team 
together to simplify and restructure food and beverage. So you start to get them involved. 
That’s one way of dealing with nervousness (Founder, BUDGET). 
Giving new employees the opportunity to take ownership of business projects reduced their 
worries and paid off in producing resource mobilization benefits anchored in a sense of 
ownership and belonging among the newly acquired employees. Employees reacted positively 
to the founders’ efforts to include them in decision-making. One middle manager, Nelson, 
commented: “He [James] engenders a sort of cooperative spirit, and he involves you in his 
venture, makes you want it to succeed… that does give me hope in the future.” By being 
transparent and inclusive, BUDGET founders calmed nervous and worried employees, and this 
stimulated their employees to share important information upward. 
You ask for information and then when [the employees] see that they’re not going to get 
beaten up or they’re not going to get punished for it and you genuinely want it for the 
reason that you said you wanted it, then they start to relax. Then they start to open up 
and they start being more confident about expressing their ideas (Founder, BUDGET). 
In contrast, in some of the firms we studied, members were more engaged in opaque, behind-
the-scenes moves (e.g., building secret political coalitions) to try to overpower one another. As 
our data show, such actions were unlikely to establish the new firm as a high-integrity 
organization. Phil, the founder of TECH, for example, tried to prevent a venture capitalist whom 
he did not appreciate from joining the board of directors, which led to continuous tensions at 
the board level, and negatively affected resource mobilization. Phil commented: “Unfortunately, 
he ended up being on the board anyway, and he was aware that we had vetoed his idea of 
being a board member. So there was tension happening, which wasn’t great.”   
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Affective influence actions conveying ability of the founder as entrepreneur. A second 
category of useful affective influence actions that founders used related to stakeholders’ 
believing in the entrepreneurs’ abilities. Abilities refer to the skills, competencies, and 
characteristics that enable the founders to have influence within some specific domain (Mayer, 
Dadis, and Schoorman, 1995). Founders play a central psychological role in building new 
businesses, as Jordi, a consultant for DRINK, explained: “Everything revolves around [the 
founders]: their ego, their insecurities, their ambitions.” Our data show that in these founder-
centric environments, some founders managed to elicit stakeholders’ positive affect toward the 
young organization by emphasizing socially valued characteristics, such as entrepreneurial 
background and achievements, total commitment, high personal energy, and also by displaying 
what we call “certainty-related emotions.” 
In terms of emphasizing valued entrepreneurial characteristics, Christine, the founder of DRINK, 
described how she addressed a private investor’s initial reluctance by first explicitly 
acknowledging his pride in having created a venture of his own and deliberately drawing 
parallels to her own entrepreneurial situation: 
He said, “I’m still not sure that you’re going to deliver.” I said, “Yes, you’re right, but you 
started with three people three years ago – that’s all I’m doing. I’ve got the same drive, so 
do you recognize that in me?” That very quickly went to the heart of this person’s 
identity, which is, he was hugely proud of having built up this thing in three years 
(Founder, DRINK). 
This deliberate triggering of a stranger’s emotions was vital for Christine’s firm acquiring 
funding. She continued, “That’s what clicked. The next morning, he was trying to buy me and 
the team. So it changed that fast. From being, ‘Who the hell are you?’ to, ‘Are you up for 
sale?’”  
Socially valued entrepreneurial characteristics can also include specific emotional displays. Our 
data suggest that venture founders can shape stakeholders’ perceptions of their ability by 
displaying feelings of certainty, such as enthusiasm, passion, or calm. Christine, the founder of 
DRINK, illustrated the favorable outcomes for her venture: 
I think we come across as a much bigger and more impactful firm than we really are. I 
also think [that this is because] the sheer amount of enthusiasm and drive in all the 
people comes across, just in the [way they speak] (Founder, DRINK). 
One of her employees confirmed that, “Christine’s enthusiasm was contagious,” and elaborated 
on the resulting resource mobilization as follows: “So you couldn’t help but actually listen to 
her and think yeah, oh my gosh, she’s right. Everyone was sharing her enthusiasm and wanted 
to get the company going.” Such emotional displays can influence external stakeholders’ (e.g., 
investors’) affect even if these stakeholders work in seemingly unemotional and rule-bound 
institutions, like governments: “The government had to select British companies for their 
funding, and they gave it to us, [based on] the criteria that we seemed to be working so hard 
and they felt that our enthusiasm would [make] the innovation work” (Founder DRINK). (Note 
how government officials linked the founder’s display of enthusiasm to a specific 
organizational outcome.) Interestingly, negative emotions such as anger and annoyance could 
produce a similar effect. When the co-founders of TECH, for example, were raising funds in the 
early days of their venture, they “would get outright annoyed if people challenged us about it 
not being a go... So we signaled this amazing belief that we knew what we were doing,” and 
this helped them win financial support, as Phil (the TECH founder) told us.  
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The literature supports our finding on the importance of passion, enthusiasm, and anger for 
decision-making under uncertainty. Appraisal theory of emotion has shown that these emotions 
occur with a sense of certainty (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). 
They promote heuristic processing and lead to greater certainty in subsequent judgments 
(Tiedens and Linton, 2001). Regarding their effect on others, Elsbach and Kramer (2003) showed 
that decision-makers in the uncertain business of movie production tend to assess screenwriters 
who are demonstrably passionate about selling their script as being creative and committed. 
Displaying certainty-related emotions can therefore help project perceptions of ability in 
stakeholders’ minds. This action strategy may not always work or can even backfire, however, 
if the emotional displays (in particular those of negative emotions such as anger, frustration or 
annoyance) are made in personally insensitive and hurtful ways, which could undermine the 
perceived benevolence of the founder, as we discuss next. 
Affective influence actions conveying benevolence of the founder. Founders can also 
influence the affect of venture stakeholders by organizing energizing events for venture 
stakeholders and by paying personalized attention to stakeholders’ needs. These actions 
communicate information about the founders’ benevolence. Benevolence here refers to kindness 
and altruism; it involves giving and doing good for others (Mayer et al., 1995). 
When founders and stakeholders go out to restaurants or bars together or attend sporting 
events or evening concerts, they move their relationships to a more personal level and augment 
their professional, business relationships. Our data show that these informal interactions, 
promoted by founders, were usually appreciated as energizing experiences for the attendees. 
They evoked such high-activation emotions as fun, excitement, and joy. John, an employee of 
CONSULT, confirmed the invigorating relationships that employees had developed with their 
managers as a result of these energizing events. “Just going out for an evening with Sam or 
Matthew [the co-founders] - it’s great fun.” He further elaborated on Sam’s often spontaneous 
organizing actions to elicit joy among the members of the young firm: “One day when we just 
won a contract… Sam just disappeared off and came back with a crateful of beer and just 
bonked it on the desk and told everyone to stop working and have fun and celebrate.” 
Although such actions may seem obviously useful, not every entrepreneur in our sample used 
them. Alex, a former partner of INVEST, for example, complained that, “so very little time was 
spent celebrating successes.”  
Eliciting stakeholders’ positive affect (e.g., fun) by celebrating successes and creating 
opportunities for personal interaction can lead to resource mobilization. For instance, it can 
foster the informal and spontaneous sharing of ideas to develop new products: 
We have fun around the office… it makes people feel like they’re really part of what’s 
going on. They really are. They can come and talk to us, genuinely about how the firm 
[is] doing. Hey, I had a great new idea for a new product – what do you think about this? 
(Founder, CONSULT). 
This affective influencing approach may be important not just with employees, but also with 
other stakeholders, such as clients. As Sam of CONSULT explained: “You take [clients] to a 
football match and all of a sudden you have something in common. The relationship takes on a 
very different angle… I suppose we’ve got a very loyal set of clients.” Indeed, cash-flow-negative 
fledgling young organizations depend on the loyalty of paying customers. (Note how both 
stakeholders and founders interpreted how emotions elicited from energizing events could be 
associated with people feeling valued for their contributions to the young firm.)  
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Beyond organizing collective energizing events, founders in our study elicited stakeholders’ 
positive affect by personalizing the attention they paid to individual stakeholders. The founders 
of BUDGET, for example, made a deliberate effort to travel and talk to all the managers of the 
hotels they acquired to find out about their individual problems and help resolve them. Sevin, a 
middle manager, confirmed founders’ caring actions: 
If I don’t phone them or speak to [the co-founders] within a week, they will phone me, 
and they’ll say to me, is your phone broken or something? Why haven’t you spoken to 
us? They want to hear from us, they want to know how we are. They want to make sure 
that we’re alright and that we haven’t got any problems. So it is an excellent company to 
work for (Hotel general manager, BUDGET) 
Sevin (BUDGET) went on to note that the founders’ attention to his personal needs made him 
“comfortable” and “happy” to work for them and mobilized his support for the new firm: “I’ve 
always been very supportive of the company.” 
In one of the ventures we studied (TECH), by contrast, when resources became tight a few years 
after founding, the entrepreneur did the exact opposite to caring for organization members’ 
personal needs. According to one top executive who had been recruited into the company, the 
founder “shouted down [the employees] in front of their fellow staff members, which is a very 
demoralizing thing to do.” Public displays of anger at TECH hurt employees’ feelings and 
nurtured the image of a “dictatorial” rather than benevolent leader, which negatively affected 
employee motivation and initiative. 
Affective influence actions conveying threat. We also found evidence (though less than for 
the other three affective influence action categories explained above) that founders used 
brinkmanship tactics, aggression and threats in order to secure benefits for their ventures in 
negotiations with investors and suppliers. Catherine, the founder of DRINK, illustrated this 
when she recalled how she had handled her high-profile London City lawyers after she had 
found out that they would charge significant fees even though their services had not yielded 
the desired benefits for the young organization: 
[I suggested] to pay small amounts every month, and said that’s what it’s going to be. 
You’ll either bankrupt me or accept it this way. And because I’ve come close to 
bankruptcy, I can say that to them and look them in the eye. Don’t mess with me. You 
push me to do this - it’s over. So you choose (Founder, DRINK). 
Such actions may have entailed short-term benefits for the young organization, as Phil (the 
founder of TECH) suggested when he mentioned how they had accelerated their first 
fundraising round by pressuring prospective financiers to make an equity investment: “We were 
putting a huge amount of pressure on them, saying we need it early or we’re going to feel 
doubts.  They said okay, we’re going to do it.” The long-term effects of these actions on 
stakeholders, however, were more difficult to ascertain, and could be even questionable, given 
how difficult it is to threaten someone while at the same time building a trustful long-term 
business relationship. 
Emotional Assuring 
Based on these findings and on the theoretical links between affective influence and trust 
developed in the discussion section below, we call the first three types of affective influence  
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actions shown in Table 2 – conveying integrity of new firm; conveying ability of founder as 
entrepreneur; conveying benevolence of founder – “emotional assuring.” This label for the new 
construct was suggested by our data. Thad, who had learned about DRINK while browsing 
through a trade journal, explained why he had made the decision to support the fledgling 
organization at a very early stage: “The team had passion and drive. They seemed to love their 
products, they seemed to enjoy selling and they seemed to enjoy the thrill of marketing 
something… I felt totally reassured.” As a result of his reassurance, Thad invested £50,000 of 
his own funds, and joined DRINK as a board member. Emotional assuring, then, refers 
to affective influence actions that seek to build three different dimensions of trust in regard to 
the new firm (see Butler, 1991; Gabarro, 1978; Mayer et al., 1995): 1) the firm’s integrity; 2) the 
founder’s competence as an entrepreneur, and 3) the founder’s benevolent character. Next, we 
examine the effects of these emotional assuring actions on organization-level outcomes; more 
specifically, on resource mobilization. 
Resource Mobilization 
Our data suggest that resource mobilization refers to personal discretionary support from 
stakeholders and to collective support. In Table 3 we present definitions of these dimensions, as 
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Table 3 
Resource Mobilization (RM) Consequences of Founders’ Affective Influence Actions 






Discretionary actions are distinct from 
transactional ones in that the former are 
largely voluntary and a priori unspecified. 
They are neither formally nor implicitly 
contracted (e.g., unexpected offers from 
potential investors to provide equity 
finance, or ideas about product 
development from employees who were 
not hired for this role).  
  “We’ve all made investments because we wanted to make the investment.” (Investor 
CONSULT; firm-level benefit because the venture received equity funding from private 
investors.) 
 “So in the first week of January, I had a call with an outline term sheet saying, we want to put a 
million £ in.” (Founder DRINK; firm-level benefit because an angel investor puts forward a 
proposal for providing equity financing to the venture.) 
“That’s what clicked. The next morning, he was trying to buy me and the team. So it changed 
that fast. From being, who the hell are you? To, are you up for sale?” (Founder DRINK; firm-
level benefit because an angel investor inquires about the possibility for providing equity 
financing to the venture.) 
 “She quit her job and came to work for us. Actually, we had an investor do exactly the same 
thing as well.” (Senior Manager, DRINK; firm-level benefit because venture was able to attract 




Stakeholders  – e.g., employees – can 
develop a sense of shared responsibility 
and collective involvement in building up 
their nascent companies, often in 
response to unforeseen problems. This 
wide involvement reduced dependency 
on a few leaders at the top. Employees 
became involved in innovation (e.g., 
developing new products) or displayed 
flexibility in operations (e.g., by 
economizing on scarce resources). 
 “They start to open up and they start being more confident about expressing their ideas.” 
(Founder BUDGET; firm-level benefit because employees collectively communicate their ideas 
for organizational improvements.) 
“No one felt pause to do something just because it’s your job and you have to do it. Everyone 
was more like sharing the enthusiasm of Caroline wanting to get the company going.” 
(Employee DRINK; firm-level benefit because employees collectively perform supporting 
actions beyond their job description to help the venture progress.) 
“They can come and talk to us, genuinely about how is the firm doing. Hey, I had a great new 
idea for a new product - what do you think about this?” (Founder CONSULT; firm-level benefit 
because employees collectively make suggestions for product innovations.) 
Note: To ensure focus on the resource mobilization construct we display only the relevant code parts in this table. The full codes include the affective influence actions that helped produce the 
respective resource mobilization outcomes. They can be provided by the authors upon request.  
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We summarize the qualitative findings of our analysis of the effects of affective influence 
actions on resource mobilization that we inferred from founders’ interviews (triangulated 
through stakeholders’ accounts) in Figure 1. The three affective influence actions that constitute 
emotional assuring frequently, though not always, led to positive resource mobilization 
outcomes. Other affective influence actions (such as the opposite of emotional assuring actions, 
indicated in Table 2 through “o” and “O”) were either often associated with negative resource 
mobilization outcomes or (e.g., if they involved the use of threats and aggression) their long-
term benefits were doubtful based on previous research (e.g., Jackson and Dutton, 1988; 
Williams, 2007). Overall, these findings strongly suggest a positive link between founders’ 
emotional assuring and young firms’ resource mobilization.  
Figure 1 

















We did not only rely, however, on micro-evidence based on individual codes which suggested a 
causal link between emotional assuring and resource mobilization outcomes. We also performed 
a qualitative analysis of the overall level of resource mobilization in our six firms. This analysis 
is shown in Table 4 (Panels A and B). Juxtaposing panels A and B of Table 4 with Table 2 
allows us to see that firms in which founders engaged in high levels of emotional assuring 
(BUDGET, CONSULT, DRINK) also achieved high levels of resource mobilization (Panel A of 
Table 4), whereas those in which founders used low levels of emotional assuring (INCUBATE, 
INVEST, TECH) only achieved low levels of resource mobilization (Panel B of Table 4).
Emotional Assuring
• Affective Influence (AI)
Actions Conveying
Integrity Of New Firm
• AI Actions Conveying
Ability Of Founder As
Entrepreneur
• AI Actions Conveying
Benevolence Of Founder
FOUNDERS’ ACTIONS
Other Affective Influence Actions
• Opposite of Emotional
Assuring Actions (see above)
• Affective Influence Actions
Conveying Threat
• Absence of Affective
Influence Actions in
Situations Where They
Could Have Been Used
ORGANIZATION-LEVEL
OUTCOMES
• Positive outcome (frequent)
• No discernible outcome (rare)
• Negative outcome (very rare)
• Positive outcome (rare)
• Negative outcome (frequent)
• Positive short-term
outcomes (some observed)
• Negative long-term consequences
(posited from previous research)
• Did not deter positive development
when resources abundant
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• Negative outcome (very rare)
• Positive outcome (rare)
• Negative outcome (frequent)
• Positive short-term
outcomes (some observed)
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(posited from previous research)
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Table 4. Panel A 
Resource Mobilization: Qualitative Assessment and Representative Quotations from “High AI” Cases 
 








“I suggested a few things, [such as] printing 
our guest directory that we designed 
ourselves, and you know, the [founders] said 
let’s do it.” (Nelson, Middle Manager.)  
“You can get people to do things when they 
wouldn’t normally want to do them.” (Peter, 
Co-founder.) 
Strong 
  “It’s probably more of an irrational 
investment, based on personalities.” (Private 
investor.) 
“Sam’s way of convincing me to join 
CONSULT was effective.” (Employee.) 
Strong 
 “I’ve since been asked to sit on two other 
government boards, one of which is 
monitoring a billion pounds spending a 
year… That’s been very good, and I think 
long-term will bear a lot of fruit. I’m one of 
only five external members, and there’ve 








  “There have been mistakes made, but it’s 
been acknowledged that those mistakes 
have been made and now we get on with it 
and find a solution…It’s about how can we 
all get together and make it a bit better.” 
(Ruth, HR Manager.) 
Strong 
 “The growing dot.com industry suddenly 
collapsed. We decided as senior managers 
to actually go out and get involved in 
projects because we didn’t have many 
employees and needed to bring revenue in. 
We were trying to ensure that we stayed a 
viable organization.”  (Lorenzo, Senior 
Manager.) 
“There’re a lot of us that joined at the start 
that are still left, and there hasn’t been a 
great deal of turnover.” (Employee.) 
Strong 
 “Everyone has the opportunity to contribute, 
and that makes a phenomenal difference to 
my motivation to the company.” (Josephine, 
Finance Director.) 
“That time when it became a real low point, 
was that the rest of us could pick up all the 
other elements of what was going on in the 
company to allow Christina to give total 
focus to that one situation and to deal with it 
and to clear it up and resolve it. “ (Rupert, 
Employee.) 
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Table 4. Panel B 
Resource Mobilization: Qualitative Assessment and Selective Quotations From “Low AI” Cases 
 






“We didn’t feel we could realistically go 
back to our shareholders and ask for more 
money until we’d sorted out what we got. 
We did try, in a relatively low-key way, 
and got a fairly direct [negative] response 
from our shareholders.” (Kurtis, Co-
founder.) 
Weak at first, then moderate 
“[The partners] were all concerned to protect 
their interest. So they got very personally 
protective and individually greedy” (Alex, 
Former CEO and Director.) 
“We spent a considerable amount of time 
trying to identify and convince [a finance 
provider], and that proved difficult. That proved 
very difficult….” (Michael, Founder.) 
Strong at first, then weak 
  AT FIRST: “We didn’t get any [skilled 
engineers] turning down our job offers. Not a 
single one.” (Patrick, Founder.) 
 THEN: “We do not have at the moment a true 







“The employees were people who were 
working in the warehouse… They were 
more like workers in a factory.” (Susan, 
Spouse of Founder.) 
Weak 
  “[The managers] were still behaving at the 
end as they were at the beginning, individually. 
So you have…their individual politicking.” 
(Alex, Former CEO.) 
Strong at first, then weak 
AT FIRST: “We asked people to defer salary. 
People turned back and wanted to defer 
actually more than we’d asked for.” (Patrick, 
Founder) 
  THEN: “There was resignation among the 
employees.” (Jim, new CEO.) 
 
Ratings of “strong,” “moderate” and “weak” reflect our qualitative assessment of stakeholder accounts. As in Panel A, this further triangulates the three proposed dimensions of RM. We draw on 
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The importance of the hypothesized link between emotional assuring and resource mobilization 
for firm survival and growth can be further assessed when considering key business challenges 
that the young firms in our sample faced. To do so, we divided our sample into three sub-
samples; each included two firms that had to deal with a similar critical business challenge. 
(That the ventures in our sample could be matched according to the similar challenges they 
faced was fortuitous. This only became clear to us during the data analysis stage, and was not 
part of our sampling strategy.) In each of the three pairs, there was one firm that used 
emotional assuring heavily. That firm also happened to be the one that dealt successfully with 
the respective challenge at hand by mobilizing adequate resources. Below, we display the 
results of this analysis for one pair of firms (DRINK and TECH) who suffered from a lack of 
product readiness. The remainder of the analysis for the other sample firms is shown in 
Appendix A. 
Differential Resource Mobilization Responses to Similar Business Challenges 
DRINK and TECH suffered from a lack of marketable products, which caused a shortage of 
sales-generated cash. DRINK’s main product (whiskey) required the time-consuming 
construction of a factory. Moreover, it had to store the final product for at least seven years 
before it attained a quality that could be sold. TECH developed wireless-communication 
solutions based on radio-frequency technology, and this required a substantial up-front R&D 
investment. Although the founders of both firms had been successful in gathering initial 
resources to launch their ventures (e.g., TECH had raised several million pounds in venture 
capital financing), both were depleting that initial investment fast, and they faced pressure to 
obtain additional support. 
DRINK was able to mobilize resources from stakeholders, individually as well as collectively, to 
creatively address the adverse conditions that threatened its survival. For example, many 
employees at all levels of the company contributed to the development of a new vodka drink. 
According to one employee, “Everyone wanted to be involved, everyone wanted to help. 
Actually, the name of the vodka was invented by an accountant.” In another example, one 
board member of DRINK hand-delivered a product sample to an important customer in 
Singapore – someone who had threatened to take business elsewhere after being sent the wrong 
sample. This action affectively influenced and impressed the customer and resulted in important 
resource benefits for the venture. Christine, the founder of DRINK, describes what happened: 
[The board member] walked in one hour before the deadline, undid the suitcases, put the 
product sample onto the bar and there they were. They were shocked… They think we 
walk on water as a result. It turns out that this key buyer also buys for all the Swiss 
hotels around the world, which is an unexpected benefit, and we got all this press from 
doing the press release on it. (Founder, DRINK.) 
TECH faced a similar business challenge in terms of product readiness. For the firm’s first two 
years, it had used its munificent venture capital funding for product development. Then, when 
Patrick, the founder, believed that the product was ready for market (and the existing venture 
financiers were becoming increasingly impatient), he switched the company’s focus away from 
product development to marketing and sales. However, sales remained very slow. Some 
members of the top team believed that the product was still having technical problems, but no 
one took care of their concerns. One sales director commented:  
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If you’re out on the front lines you’re seeing how everything is working, you’re seeing all 
the holes. I was just coming back and saying, “Boy, guys, this isn’t as good as we think it 
is. There are many problems ….” [The founder] would hear nothing of it. I was basically 
told that I was going to be fired if I brought it up again. (Sales Director, TECH.) 
Under pressure, the founder’s affective influence actions (as indicated in Table 2) discouraged 
employees from taking initiative. Rather than support the company in new and unexpected 
ways, like the members of DRINK, “the employees [of TECH] would just end up doing what they 
were told,” noted the new incoming CEO. “[There was] resignation among them.” The lack of 
resource mobilization made the company slide into a downward spiral. Relations among 
organization members deteriorated, the founder was fired by a divided board of directors, and 
the assets of the company were finally sold. 
We can only speculate that more frequent use of emotional assuring (as practiced, for example, 
by Christine of DRINK) could have helped TECH deal more constructively with the critical 
survival challenge of lack of sales-generated cash. It could have given the young organization 
some “breathing room” to explore and find alternative approaches to its business problem, and 
thus tipped the balance toward a more positive outcome. 
Contingency Conditions Related to Emotional Assuring 
The relationship between emotional assuring and resource mobilization can be further nuanced. 
When founders performed emotional assuring, our data suggest two important moderating 
conditions. We call the first “high-touch” interaction, meaning the quality of interactions 
between founders and stakeholders. We call the second “authenticity,” meaning the way 
stakeholders evaluate the honesty of founders in social interactions.  
High-touch interaction as a moderator. Emotional assuring seems well received when it occurs 
in a high-touch (that is, open, safe, and face-to-face) environment. Stakeholders saw the 
founders as approachable, willing to listen to others, and engaging in non-threatening 
dialogue. Sevin, a middle manager at BUDGET, described it this way:  
What makes me feel comfortable working for this venture is that the founders are very 
contactable, they’re very approachable. They’re easy to talk to. If I have a problem, I 
know that I can talk about it. If something goes wrong, I know that I can talk about it 
without any repercussions. (Middle manager, BUDGET.) 
And Roman, an investor in CONSULT, confirmed this: “I do know that [the founders] operate a 
very open-door policy. They’re both very approachable people. They’re receptive to the needs 
and wants of their employees.” This context encourages employees to express their thoughts 
and a wide range of emotions honestly. It also fosters respect for personal sensitivities and 
diverse ways of expressing emotion (Putnam and Mumby, 1993; Martin et al., 1998), 
and provides opportunities for emotional assuring to be enacted in customized, timely, and 
situation-specific ways. Managers can recognize situations in which their employees need 
emotional support and tailor emotional assuring to their personal needs. Recipients of 
emotional assuring are more receptive to such influence when the founders take them seriously, 
understand their problems, and believe that they can contribute to the company. Based on our 
data and on the theoretical arguments above, we speculate that this factor moderates the 
relation between emotional assuring and resource mobilization: The higher the “touch,” 
the stronger the positive association.  
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Authenticity as a moderator. The effectiveness of emotional assuring can also depend on the 
way in which people perceive the personal integrity of those who perform it. Our data suggest 
that authentic founders — that is, those whom stakeholders perceive as true to themselves and 
honest with others — can be particularly effective at emotional assuring. For example, when 
one promised investment in DRINK did not materialize, the company faced an acute cash crisis 
and could not pay its suppliers (issuing checks that bounced). Rather than hiding these 
problems, the founder showed authenticity in their symbolic reparative actions to elicit 
suppliers’ comfort. 
So we just told the truth. We called the [suppliers and said], “We’ve had a complete 
disaster. We’ve had an investor who was going to come in. We’re going to give you £100 
out of our own pocket because it’s all we’ve got… We don’t have any money in the 
company at the moment. I don’t know what’s going to happen. But as a matter of 
goodwill, we will give it to you from ourselves.” And that single gesture saved us. 
(Founder, DRINK.) 
The disarming honesty displayed by Christine, the founder, probably increased the calming 
effect that her symbolic payment had on the suppliers. Why do people value authenticity in 
business transactions beyond the ethical value of honesty? Research on customer service 
suggests that a perceived authentic smile directly enhances customer satisfaction because it is 
evidence of someone’s willingness to go beyond task requirements (Grandey and Brauburger, 
2002). Conversely, customer satisfaction is diminished by inauthentic actions, such as fake 
smiles, which are interpreted as crude impression management (Bolino, 1999). These arguments, 
together with our data, lead us to surmise that the stronger the founder’s authenticity, the 
stronger the positive association between emotional assuring and resource mobilization. 
Limits to Emotional Assuring 
We identified further limitations to emotional assuring. At the risk of stating the obvious, we 
found that it is difficult to use emotional assuring equally well on everyone – even where 
entrepreneurs use it often and many stakeholders agree about the resulting benefits. At 
CONSULT, for example, we detected a dissenting voice among the six people whom we 
interviewed; one employee indicated that he no longer wanted to stay with the growing 
company and therefore did not feel inclined to do any more work than was required of him. He 
believed that the company had inadequately acknowledged his earlier contributions: 
Recently I’ve been off-project or on the bench for about three or four months and I was 
basically advised that if a project wasn’t found, then I’d be made redundant, which I felt 
was quite unfair considering that I’d actually spent about four out of the five years full-
time working and keeping the company afloat. (Employee, CONSULT.) 
Thus, even in firms that practiced emotional assuring, founders sometimes failed to tailor it to 
specific individuals. Even if they did, moreover, some stakeholders may not appreciate the 
effort. Because effective emotional assuring often requires personalized customization for 
stakeholders with diverse needs and preferences, not all attempts succeed. 
Moreover, some founders may not use much emotional assuring at all. Michael, the founder of 
INVEST, for example, appraised a disruptive event in a cognitive, affect-neutral way when he 
described why and how the top team fired one of their original partners:  
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We learned that he was not working together with us, which was a bit stressful, because 
I mean, I’ve been sitting with this person for the last four years. But he was just too 
political, and he was really bad-mouthing everyone else so he could get ahead of the 
others. We felt that that was unjustified and asked him to leave, which wasn’t traumatic, 
but it was a little bit tense. (Founder, INVEST.) 
Michael did not mention any emotional assuring action he had tried with the ousted partner or 
with people who interacted with this partner, although this might have been beneficial. (In 
contrast, Christine, the founder of DRINK, made sure that any parting employees felt good 
towards her venture because “if they leave and they feel wonderful about the company, they’re 
going to tell everybody else about it.”) At first glance, this lack of use of emotional assuring 
seems surprising given that these actions are relatively easy and economically inexpensive for 
the founders to use, and the resource mobilization benefits can be significant. Landis, the 
founder of INCUBATE, gave us a hint about why he was less engaged in it: “We had always 
said to ourselves that we would let rationality get the better of emotion, and if we saw 
something was not going to work, we wouldn’t do it.” In other words, Landis seemed to have 
espoused the generalized view that emotion-related actions are dysfunctional in the 
management of a business. 
A second factor that may have prevented some founders from using emotional assuring could 
have been a lack of understanding, or oversight of how important these actions really are. Alex, 
a former partner at INVEST, who subsequently retrained as an executive coach, explained that 
he had preferred to handle the significant problems that occurred within the management team 
of their young organization in a more cognitive, task-focused manner: “What we did was to sit 
down [with a colleague who had a problem] and talk to him, talk him through the logical steps 
so he could see whether he could or couldn’t do what he wanted to achieve.” Alex regretted this 
purely cognitive task-oriented approach later: 
My subsequent training is as an executive coach. Had I had this skill set back in 1999-
2000, I’m sure things would have developed differently. I would have been able to make 
interventions with people such that they would have stayed together as a team. But I 
didn’t know and obviously you can’t rewrite history… Management of emotions, getting 
people to understand what’s happening to others is a key part of the coaching I now 
provide. If only I knew then what I know n o w ,  I  t h i n k  w e  c o u l d  h a v e  h e l p e d  t h e  
individuals in INVEST. (Co-founder, INVEST.) 
Discussion 
Our five-year field study reveals a variety of affective influence actions that entrepreneurs used 
to mobilize resources for their young organizations. A subset of these actions we call emotional 
assuring seems particularly helpful for weathering economic crises and business challenges 
when it is harder to convince stakeholders to support uncertain operations. Figure 2 
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Figure 2 













The model depicted in Figure 2 shows that entrepreneurs’ emotional assuring actions that 
convey the integrity of their new firms, their own ability as competent entrepreneurs and their 
own quality as benevolent persons serve firm-building purposes by mobilizing resources, 
individually and collectively, from stakeholders. This effect is strengthened (i.e., moderated 
positively) if emotional assuring occurs in a high-touch environment and if founders are 
perceived to have authenticity. And it is likely to be supported by trust-building, as we 
elaborate next. 
Affective Influence, Trust Building, and Organization Creation 
What explains the positive effect of emotional assuring on resource mobilization? Beyond the 
presumed direct effect of emotional assuring – such as eliciting emotions that can directly 
motivate cooperative and pro-social behaviors (e.g., Fredrickson, 1998; Williams, 2001) – we 
argue that a deeper and more durable social mechanism underpin the link between emotional 
assuring and resource mobilization. That mechanism is trust-building. 
Emerging conceptual research on affective influence and collaboration across firms has 
emphasized trust as a means to regulate the threat of opportunism between various parties 
(Williams, 2007). This threat is likely to exist in the minds of firm founders and their 
stakeholders, at least initially. Trust here refers to a party’s willingness to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party, based on the expectation that this other party will perform a particular 
action important to the first party, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust has been shown to foster discretionary behaviors such as 
informal agreements and cooperation and to supplement the efficiency of formal contracts 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Uzzi, 1997). Trust reduces the need for stakeholders to closely 
monitor the firm’s behavior, to formalize procedures, and to create completely specified 
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contracts (Powell, 1990). It also provides firms with such benefits as more access to tacit 
knowledge, “richer-freer” information, or increased risk-sharing (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 
1994), and it also increases motivation to devote resources to joint goals (Dirks and Ferrin, 
2001). Trust can be particularly important under high uncertainty, when stakeholders harbor 
doubt about the venture (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). Therefore, in what follows, we 
elaborate on how our inductively derived categories of affective influence actions may help 
build trust between founders and firm stakeholders, and how this, in turn, can enhance resource 
mobilization. 
Scholars have suggested that perception of the trustee’s level of trustworthiness can be 
explained by three key characteristics: integrity, ability, and benevolence (e.g., Butler, 1991; 
Gabarro, 1978; Mayer et al., 1995). Each characteristic contributes cumulatively to trust 
formation. It is probably no coincidence that the three characteristics of trust map almost 
perfectly with the three types of emotional assuring actions we discovered in our research.
4 
The first group of affective influence actions we identified – those “conveying the integrity of 
the new firm” – includes being honest about venture risks and displaying inclusive and 
transparent organizing actions. Such actions may help create stakeholders’ perceptions that the 
young firm is disposed to behave with high integrity and needs a minimum of close monitoring. 
Displays of managerial inclusivity and transparency, as opposed to autocracy and opacity, 
make stakeholders feel less vulnerable to the threats of information asymmetry and 
opportunism that often exist in young ventures (Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998). We posit that 
these actions build one particular type of trust, cognition-based trust, because this type relies on 
judgment of another party’s reliability in task operations (Chua et al., 2008; Kotha and Wicks, 
2008; McAllister, 1995). 
The second type of affective influence actions we identified   – those that convey the “ability of 
the founder as an entrepreneur” – are the ones that emphasize valued entrepreneurial 
characteristics and exude confidence through displays of certainty-related emotions. These 
actions likely enhance stakeholders’ perceptions that the founder is competent to build a 
successful business. In the early days of firm creation, success very much hinges on the ability 
of the founders. In exhibiting salient entrepreneurship characteristics to stakeholders who might 
value these, founders generate positive emotional responses that they and their stakeholders 
experience when their goals and identity (e.g., self-esteem and self-image as entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneur-supporting) are validated or enhanced (Carver and Scheier, 1998). Moreover, 
champions of new businesses display commitment and conviction in the unproven value of 
their new business offerings, expressed through passion, excitement, and/or comfort in regard 
to the firm’s offerings. We posit that this second type of affective influence actions, then, also 
helps build cognition-based trust, a type of trust that relies on judgment of another party’s 
competence in task delivery (Chua et al., 2008; Kotha and Wicks, 2008; McAllister, 1995). 
The third group of affective influence actions we saw – those that communicate “benevolence of 
the founder as a person” – involves organizing energizing events for stakeholders and paying 
personalized attention to their needs. Stakeholders likely experience this type of affective influence 
                                              
4 Although we labeled our three emotional assuring action types along these three trust characteristics, we would 
like to emphasize that we first derived these action types inductively from our data, and only later discovered, 
subsequent to our reading of the trust literature, that our action categories mapped almost perfectly onto the three 
trust characteristics. We relabeled our action categories accordingly. In other words, trust characteristics did not 
influence our initial inductive derivation of the various affective influence action categories.  
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as an “emotional gift” of care and liking (Clark, 2004). People are reluctant to work with task-
competent people whom they do not personally like because they may perceive them to be ill-
intended and unwilling to cooperate in good faith (Casciaro and Lobo, 2008). Displaying liking and 
care helps build affect-based trust, which is more enduring and generalizable over situations than 
cognition-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Once formed, beliefs that a young firm (initially 
through its founders) will protect stakeholders’ well-being can spill over to the other domains and 
reduce their fears of future harm (Williams, 2007). Through these founders’ actions, stakeholders 
could even attribute a benevolent “personal character” to the young organization and 
anthropomorphize it (Kraatz and Block, 2008). 
It is important to note that these three types of emotional assuring actions might have been less 
effective in fostering stakeholders’ perceived trustworthiness without the two moderating 
conditions of high-touch interaction and authenticity of the actor that we identified in our 
findings. High-touch interaction can be costly to founders in terms of the time and effort it 
requires (Mayer and Salovey, 1997), something stakeholders generally recognize and appreciate, 
further increasing stakeholders’ perception of founders’ trustworthiness (Williams, 2007). 
Meanwhile, perceiving authenticity is essential to assumed trustworthiness. Authenticity —being 
sincere, transparent, connected to self and to others— is widely valued in modern Western 
societies (Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008). Opportunistic individuals should find trust-
building emotional assuring difficult to fake for two reasons: 1) the facial expressions of certain 
emotions, such as concern, are more difficult to voluntarily control than others, such as joy 
(Ekman, 1985), and 2) frequently, true feelings leak out through the behavioral channels that 
are less controllable (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1992). People can choose their words carefully 
but are less adept at controlling an internally consistent set of facial, vocal, and bodily 
expressions. In the long run, through repeated affective influence actions, founders provide 
many opportunities for stakeholders to observe and detect inconsistencies between verbal and 
nonverbal behavior, between benevolent and harmful actions. 
As various emotional assuring actions help build different types of trust, whether cognition – or 
affect-based, our study adds nuance to an existing tension in the trust literature. Scholars have 
found that cognition – and affect-based trust can undermine each other (Chua et al., 2008), 
particularly in normal, relatively stable social settings. For instance, when A receives economic 
resources or task advice from B, the level of cognition-based trust that A has for B is higher 
than it might be otherwise but the level of affect-based trust is lower. This tension could be less 
pronounced in the context of firm creation. Risks inherent in firm creation are so high that 
both cognition – and affect-based trust need to be present to adequately allay the anxieties of 
wary stakeholders. 
Within our proposed concept of emotional assuring, the variety of affective influence actions in 
our findings offers a glimpse into how trust is built. Stakeholders’ trust in new firms grows and 
develops when founders address affectively a variety of basic concerns about integrity, 
competence and benevolence. It logically makes sense that a “requisite variety” (Weick, 1979) 
of different affective influence actions will be needed because different stakeholders are likely 
to have different needs because of their particular preferences, situations, or mental prototypes 
(Elsbach and Kramer, 2003). How frequently these emotional assuring actions need to be 
enacted will likely vary as well, due to these different perspectives. Venture capitalists, for 
example, are likely to value founders’ repeated emotional assuring actions “because repeated 
behaviors might reflect a deeper level of involvement and commitment to a proposed venture” 
(Chen et al., 2009).  
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Summary of Contributions, And Future Research  
We believe our theory of emotional assuring contributes to the literatures on entrepreneurship, 
emotions in organizations, and trust. Despite the potential importance of affect in the building 
of new firms, research on entrepreneurs’ social influence actions and resource mobilization has 
largely focused on cognition and has paid insufficient attention to emotion. To the best of our 
knowledge, no prior empirical research has systematically examined the variety of affective 
influence actions that founders use and how these actions influence firm outcomes. In fact, 
much of the entrepreneurship literature still assumes that resource holders are predominantly 
cognitive-rational decision-makers. Our research may be one of the first empirical studies to 
show that resource holders are susceptible to affective influence, the implicit interaction 
between affective influence and cognitive interpretation of trustworthiness, and how and why 
affective influence matters for the development of young organizations. 
Emotional assuring as an emotion-based form of trust-building may also help explain some of 
the inconsistent results in prior empirical studies that included certain types of founders’ 
affective influence, in particular, in regards to their displays of passion. Lack of trust could help 
explain, for example, why Chen and colleagues (2009) found that displays of entrepreneurial 
passion failed to persuade venture capitalists in one-time interactions (business plan 
presentations). The authors suspected that more substantive mechanisms may be required. 
Trust-building could be such a mechanism. Indeed, for entrepreneurs, trust may be as important 
to cultivate as legitimacy, which is generally viewed as the cornerstone of resource 
accumulation and growth of new ventures (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
Our study thus contributes to the emerging stream of research into entrepreneurial agency and 
firm-building as a process of social construction (e.g., Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; McMullen 
and Shepherd, 2006; Rindova, Barry, and Ketchen, 2009; Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 2001; 
Zott and Huy, 2007) and developing relational capital (e.g., Adler and Kwon, 2002; Blatt, 2009; 
Graebner, 2009). Our findings underline how resource-poor founders can still be resourceful 
and “create something from nothing” by using emotional assuring actions which elicit support, 
individually as well as collectively, from existing and prospective firm stakeholders. This 
complements recent findings on entrepreneurial bricolage, a process in which founders combine 
given physical, social or institutional inputs (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Our study shows how 
emotional assuring can help founders mobilize new resources. 
Moreover, previous research on emotions in organizations has tended to ignore the uncertain 
firm creation context and focused on routine customer service interactions in established 
organizations such as Disneyland or airlines (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Van Maanen and Kunda, 
1989). We contribute to this literature by identifying a few relevant categories of affective 
influence actions (from among many possibilities) in the founding context and by linking them 
causally with resource mobilization outcomes at the organization level. We also show how firm 
founders use these actions, to what effect, and the conditions under which they matter. By 
evoking and integrating cognition-based and affect-based trust as theoretical mechanisms in 
our model, we explain how seemingly-brief affective influence actions can lead to sustained 
support for young organizations; mechanisms which the extant emotion literature has not 
explained sufficiently.  
Finally, little empirical research on trust has focused on the actions that people use to build 
trust (see review by Williams, 2007). Scholars have most often described trust-building as a 
relatively passive process of collecting data about other people’s trustworthiness by observing  
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their behaviors in various situations over time (e.g., Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) or by using 
information from proxy sources (e.g., Burt and Knez, 1996; Zucker, 1986). Our study 
contributes to the trust literature by articulating the variety of affective influence actions that 
founders use to intentionally build trust in their new firms. To mobilize resources under high 
uncertainty, trust needs to be built in both the firm (particularly, in its integrity) and the 
founder (in her or his competence and benevolence). Our proposed multi-level theory of 
emotional assuring provides even more texture by specifying the kinds of emotion-based 
actions that help build two distinct types of trust, cognition – and affect-based trust, both of 
which seem to be required in the highly uncertain context of firm creation. 
Our study also suggests rich opportunities for future research. Inductive findings based on a 
limited number of cases need to be further validated with testing of large samples. Because the 
context of this study is circumscribed to one geographical area (London), the specificity of this 
cultural milieu could have influenced the specific variety of emotional assuring actions that we 
found, and their effectiveness could vary in a different culture. Despite this geographical 
limitation, we suspect that our general categories of emotional assuring actions are likely to 
apply to many diverse contexts insofar as they are related to building different dimensions of 
trust. What may vary, though, are the specific affective influence tactics founders likely use to 
develop these. Future research can enrich our understanding of the role of emotional assuring 
in organization creation in diverse cultural contexts. 
Future research could also investigate why founders differ so much in their practice of affective 
influence. We posit reasons ranging from variations in emotional intelligence and personality 
traits to socialization within the Protestant work ethic, which generally considers as 
unprofessional paying attention to affect at work (Sanchez-Burks, 2002). Although our data do 
not allow us to make definitive causal statements, we suspect that some combination of nature 
(e.g. emotional intelligence or personality attributes) and nurture (e.g., social influence and 
belief about the weakness of paying attention to emotions at work) may be at play. 
In addition, researchers could explore, theoretically as well as empirically, interactions among 
affective influence and other types of social influence, such as symbolic management, which is 
particularly relevant in the context of organization creation (e.g., Rao, 1994; Zott and Huy, 2007). 
Symbolic management can be construed as a process of story-telling (Lounsbury and Glynn, 
2001), and what makes stories convincing could well be their emotional appeal (Weick 1999). 
Rafaeli and Vilnai-Yavetz (2004) have demonstrated that making sense of the symbolic dimensions 
of mundane artifacts (e.g., the color of a bus) can evoke strong emotions toward both the artifact 
and the organization that produces it. Affective influence may, therefore, complement symbolic 
management, and entrepreneurs could draw on both in their efforts to mobilize resources.  
To conclude, our study considers people as whole beings – operating on both cognitive and 
emotional levels – in business settings. Founders of new firms who appeal to stakeholders’ 
hearts, as well as minds, should be able to tip the balance in their favor with stakeholders 
willing to support them, especially when times get tough. We hope that by providing a nuanced 
perspective on the role of affect in building new firms, this research will ultimately contribute 
to a more developed theory of entrepreneurial leadership and action. A more complete 
understanding of the social processes by which entrepreneurs create organizations will help us 
appreciate the enormous accomplishments through which they create new wealth for 
themselves, their stakeholders, and the societies in which they are embedded.  
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Appendix A 
Differential Resource Mobilization Responses to Similar Challenges 
 
BUDGET and INCUBATE: Acquisition Integration Challenge 
About one year after their successful launches, both firms acquired new companies. BUDGET 
had the unexpected opportunity of acquiring a chain of 11 hotels and integrate them into its 
much smaller operations. Sevin, a middle manager, had this to say: “There was sort of like 500 
extra staff overnight. That was a huge difference for everybody to take in.” The founders 
discovered that they could count on the support of their organization members to solve the 
many problems that arose. Recently recruited middle managers offered help. Sevin, for 
example, volunteered to run one new hotel until a new general manager was found. He 
explained as follows:  
I personally just wanted to help wherever I could and, you know, offer my services… 
They were looking to get a general manager for that hotel to open it. So I went down and 
took it over, and got the staff employed, got all the orders delivered for the hotel, ordered 
all the crockery and cutlery and things like chairs and office equipment, and oversaw the 
project until they got a manager in place. (Middle manager, BUDGET.) 
Ruth, a HR manager, acknowledged that “the people working within the individual hotels work 
very hard.” She attributed this high level of resource mobilization partly to the founders’ efforts 
at engaging others: “The organization allows people to put forward ideas and to get involved in 
developing services and products.” This enabled the nascent firm to master the unplanned 
challenge that sudden growth by acquisition brought about.  
The founders of INCUBATE, too, intended to use firm acquisitions as a means for growth. They 
bought retailers of natural products and garden products, merged these companies with another 
retailer, and moved these businesses to a common location. Their goals were to achieve greater 
efficiency in terms of both scale and scope and to create a consolidated retail platform from 
which to grow. However, resource mobilization in this venture was low; for example, 
employees took little initiative in their day-to-day work. The co-founder gave us an illustration 
of how someone on the staff sourced products but then did not make them available for sale. 
“The buyer was buying stuff, arranging stuff, actually getting it into the warehouse, but it 
wasn’t getting put in the shop.” The founders assumed that their subordinates were lacking 
basic skills, and did not even make an effort to affectively influence them. As the co-founder 
told us: 
Reporting to me are people who are 100% executing operators. One guy manages the 
warehouse. He sits in on meetings. You know, he’ll last five minutes and he’ll fall asleep. 
I have a bookkeeper who gets paid £14,000 a year. She doesn’t have the ability to do 
anything more than menial data entry tasks. (Co-founder, INCUBATE.) 
INCUBATE eventually showed signs of strain and misalignment among important stakeholders, 
even among members of the top team. The lead founder left the business due to its lack of 
growth and profitability, and the company very nearly went bankrupt. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
CONSULT and INVEST: Lack Of Customers 
CONSULT and INVEST both had problems with customer acceptance. Prospective customers 
considered their proposed products too new. INVEST intended to sell a new financial product 
for early-stage hi-tech companies, such as those in computing. “That took time, it was a bit of 
missionary work, doing the wooing and running,” explained the founder. CONSULT, on the 
other hand, offered e-business consulting services, which involved integrating information 
technology with a client’s strategy processes, and the transfer of a client’s business processes to 
the Internet. During the prolonged downturn of the information-technology industry and 
skepticism regarding the viability of e-business that followed the crash of the global high-tech 
stock markets in early 2000, CONSULT experienced low market acceptance. Sam, the founder, 
noted that “the projects weren’t selling.” 
As with the other cases that we discussed, CONSULT and INVEST were successful in assembling 
the initial resource base to get launched, but then, once their economic resources dried up and 
the “going got tough,” CONSULT was better able to mobilize resources than INVEST. It rallied 
its troops — consultants and staff alike — behind the shared goals of finding new clients and 
developing new lines of business. Internal and external stakeholders provided discretionary and 
collective support to the firm in identifying new business opportunities. INVEST, by contrast, 
stuck to its product line and to its goal of educating potential customers about the advantages 
of its novel product. Distracting conflicts within the top team seriously delayed fundraising. The 
company had, in effect, to be restarted; the fund (i.e., the pool of money available for investing) 
that they had initially raised from external investors was closed. 
 